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ABSTRACT
Shareholders are organizing and mobilizing on new social media
platforms like Twitter. This changes the dynamics of shareholder
proxy contests in ways that favor shareholders over management.
Disruptive technology may bring about a shareholder revolution,
which may not be in shareholders’ best interests, at least from the
perspective of shareholder wealth maximization, and it also has
powerful implications for the future of corporate social
responsibility.
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INTRODUCTION
Twitter offers a platform for global social interaction. Twitter users
send “tweets,” which are a sort of 140-character text message to the
world. About 500 million tweets are sent every day.1 This social media
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law; J.D.,
University of Chicago Law School, cum laude; B.A., University of Florida, manga cum
laude.
1. About, TWITTER, https://about.twitter.com/company (last visited Mar. 5, 2015).
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platform can be a powerful force for enabling collective action in
modern society.
This essay will focus on one type of collective action that many
scholars have concluded simply does not work. Shareholder activism,
which has long been plagued by collective action problems including
rational apathy and free riding, could be rejuvenated by emerging social
media tools like Twitter. Tweets are a cheap and easy way for
shareholders to engage with each other and build consensus and support
for collective action.
The notion that Twitter facilitates collective action is not new 2
(although this paper’s application of Twitter to shareholder activism is
novel). Twitter and other forms of social media have been widely
adopted by marketing firms and political campaigns as a means of
coordinating otherwise disconnected individuals and groups. Perhaps
most famously, scholars of the Arab Spring widely credit Twitter, along
with Facebook, YouTube, and other social information networks, with
galvanizing Arab Spring activism.3
The Arab Spring was a revolutionary movement that began in
Tunisia on December 17, 2010 and erupted into large-scale protests
across the Arab world by mid-2012.4 The result of these civil uprisings
was the overthrow of authoritarian and totalitarian leaders in Tunisia,
Egypt, Yemen and Libya.5 The root causes of these mass protests are
complex and multifaceted. But many scholars agree that a major catalyst
2. See, e.g., Alexandra Segerberg & W. Lance Bennett, Social Media and the
Organization of Collective Action: Using Twitter to Explore the Ecologies of Two
Climate Change Protests, 13 COMM. REV. 197 (2011) (concluding that Twitter and
similar social technologies provide new social organizing mechanisms that provide new
data about these movements and their participants).
3. See, e.g., P.N. Howard et al., Opening Closed Regimes: What Was the Role of
Social Media During the Arab Spring?, PITPI (2011), http://pitpi.org/index.php/
2011/09/11/opening-closed-regimes-what-was-the-role-of-social-media-during-thearab-spring/.
4. Ismaeel Naar, Timeline: Arab Spring, AL JAZEERA (Dec. 17, 2013),
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2013/12/timeline-arab-spring20131217114018534352.html; Garry Blight, Sheila Pulham & Paul Torpey, The Path
to Protest, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 5, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/world/
interactive/2011/mar/22/middle-east-protest-interactive-timeline.
5. A
Climate of Change, THE ECONOMIST (July 13, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21580624-spring-proved-fickle-arabsare-still-yearning-it-says-max-rodenbeck.
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for the Arab Spring was the advent of social media, especially Twitter,
and its role in driving awareness and collective action.6
I. THE REVOLUTION WILL NOT BE TELEVISED
Many scholars have made analogies between corporations and
nations. 7 A corporation’s charter is often referred to as a “private
constitution.” 8 Shareholders have the right to elect the leaders of
corporations, the board of directors, much as democratic citizens have
the right to elect legislators. Those analogies are worth revisiting in an
era where overly authoritarian nations risk being overthrown by the
tweeting masses and their charismatic leaders.
It turns out that a lot of things can be said in 140 characters. For
example, Carl Icahn, the famous activist investor, grabbed Wall Street
and the tech world’s attention when he tweeted caustically, “All would
be swell at Dell if Michael and the board bid farewell.”9 However, the
SEC-mandated disclosure that is supposed to be included on all publicsecurities-related communications is not among them. 10 Another

6. See, e.g., Howard et al., supra note 3 (analyzing over three million tweets,
gigabytes of YouTube content, and thousands of blog posts. The study reported three
main findings: (1) social media played a central role in shaping political debates in the
Arab Spring, (2) a spike in online revolutionary conversation often preceded major
events on the ground and (3) social media helped spread democratic ideas across
international borders).
7. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We
Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful
Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 8-9 (2010) (“Although
there are obvious and important reasons not to take analogizing the governance of forprofit corporations to the governance of actual political republics too far, it is also vital
not to ignore the clear influence republican principles have had on the American
approach to corporate law.”).
8. See Alan R. Palmiter, Public Corporation as Private Constitution, 6 ICFAI J.
CORP. & SEC. L. 8 (2009).
9. Carl Icahn, TWITTER, (July 24, 2013, 8:12 AM EST), https://twitter.com/
carl_c_icahn/status/360054783744294913.
10. Recent SEC guidance allows Tweets to hyperlink to the mandatory disclosure
legend. Whether each Tweet or just one in a series of Tweets must contain the legend is
one of several questions remaining about how the SEC will govern tweets. See, e.g.,
Candace Jackson, SEC’s Social Media Guidance on Required Legends Raises More
Questions, HUSCH BLACKWELL (May 12, 2014), available at
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problem with using Twitter to communicate about securities matters is
that it might violate Regulation Fair Disclosure.
As a purely legal matter, Twitter is limited in its ability to facilitate
shareholder activism. Shareholder communication rules are more liberal
than ever,11 but shareholder voting rules remain strictly limited by SEC
rules and securities laws. Shareholders can and do use Twitter to
communicate and become informed about important upcoming
shareholder votes. For example, shareholders who would never
rationally read a 300-page proxy statement might respond to a 140character tweet. But if shareholders actually want to vote for a precatory
proposal or against management, they still need to fill out a proxy card
or attend the annual meeting to vote.12 And the proposing shareholder
still has to actually attend the meeting.13 In an increasingly digital world,
such traditional structures start to seem quaint, inconvenient, and
unnecessary, leaving one to wonder why a physical meeting even needs
to take place.14
Attending an SEC-mandated shareholder voting procedure costs
time and trouble beyond what a small shareholder is rationally willing to
spend. But all that can change with online shareholder voting. 15 The

http://www.securitieslawinsider.com/2014/05/secs-social-media-guidance-on-requiredlegends-raises-more-questions/.
11. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the Institutional Investor: A Half-Time
Report, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 837, 840-41 (1994).
12. 17 C.F.R § 240.14a–8 (2011).
13. Id.
14. Twenty-two states, including Delaware, allow virtual-only shareholder
meetings. Federal laws are silent regarding virtual-only shareholder meetings. The New
York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ require listed companies to provide shareholders
with the opportunity to discuss company affairs with management, which a virtual
meeting can supply. See, e.g., Guidelines for Protecting and Enhancing Online
Shareholder Participation in Annual Meetings: The Best Practices Working Group for
Online Shareholder Participation in Annual Meetings, BROADRIDGE (2012), available
at
http://media.broadridge.com/documents/Broadridge-Guidelines-For-ShareholderParticipation-Report.pdf.
15. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1745 (2006) (“A rational shareholder will
expend the effort necessary to make informed decisions only if the expected benefits
outweigh the costs. Given the length and complexity of corporate disclosure documents,
the opportunity cost entailed in making informed decisions is significant. In contrast,
the expected benefits of becoming informed are quite low, as most shareholders’

2015]

A LITTLE BIRDIE SAID: HOW TWITTER
IS DISRUPTING SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM

699

SEC could do away with the rules requiring physical meetings, and the
proxy process could be replaced with direct, real-time democracy.
In fact, it is so onerous to attend the physical annual meetings that
most shareholders do not go.16 Instead they submit ballots to designated
representatives who then tabulate them and vote by proxy. 17 Perhaps
with the only exception being the widely followed and well-attended
Berkshire-Hathaway annual meeting, most shareholders cannot justify
the cost of exercising their voting rights in person.18 Thus, a great deal
of shareholders cast their vote without the benefit of annual meeting
presentations and participatory question and answer sessions. 19 More
shareholders might attend and vote electronically, if annual meetings
were simulcast or otherwise electronically interactive.20
The SEC could reform Rule 14a, which governs the public
shareholder voting process, to allow voting online. The formal proxy
solicitation process could be replaced by a more fluid and dynamic
system to facilitate social media shareholder activism. With just a few
liberalizing reforms, the SEC could usher in a new era of shareholder
activism, perhaps even creating a new form of corporation, governed by
shareholder direct democracy.

holdings are too small to have significant effects on the vote’s outcome. Accordingly,
corporate shareholders are rationally apathetic.”).
16. Lisa M. Fairfax, Mandating Board-Shareholder Engagement?, 2013 U. ILL. L.
REV. 821, 844 (2013) (“[M]ost shareholders in public corporations are dispersed and
hence do not attend the annual meeting in person; instead they attend and vote by
proxy.”).
17. Id.
18. See Bainbridge, supra note 15 and accompanying text.
19. See Fairfax, supra note 16, at 845.
20. A simulcast or simultaneous broadcast is the transmission of a live event across
multiple different media simultaneously. For example, the annual meeting could be
transmitted securely over the Internet using the H.323 Internet Protocol
Videoconferencing standard, while it is also being held live. For more information
about secure Internet shareholder voting over webinar simulcast, see Andrew
Regenscheid & Geoff Beier, Security Best Practices for the Electronic Transmission of
Election Materials for UOCAVA Voters, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH. (2011).
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A. RULE 14A
Rule 14a governs shareholders’ rights to present proposals at the
annual meeting. 21 In an interesting juxtaposition of history, Rule 14a
was itself born in the crucible of war. In 1942, just a few months after
the December 7th attack on Pearl Harbor—when democracy itself
seemed mortally vulnerable to totalitarian regimes—Congress decided
to bolster democracy at home through the institution of capitalism.22
Congress determined that shareholders of public companies
regulated by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 lacked vital rights to
voice their concerns about corporate mismanagement. Thus Congress
passed, and the SEC promulgated, rules allowing shareholders to
propose “precatory proposals” for a shareholder vote. The rules,
Congress reasoned, would provide for a kind of “shareholder
democracy.”23
A precatory proposal is a type of non-binding resolution. The
shareholders get to vote on a precatory proposal, but even if it passes,
management does not have to accede to shareholder demands. But
precatory proposals have force nonetheless. Just like the congressman
who needs to think about the next election almost as soon as he is
installed in office, directors cannot afford to alienate their voting base. A
director who constantly ignores shareholder proposals may not
successfully stand for reelection, just as a congressman will have trouble
securing votes if he ignores demands from his constituents.24

21.
22.

17 C.F.R § 240.14a–8 (2011).
Alan R. Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed Experiment in
Merit Regulation, 45 ALA. L. REV. 879, 879 (1994) (“The history of Rule 14a-8 offers,
in microcosm, a study of federal involvement in the shareholder-management
relationship of the American public corporation. Emerging from the Great Depression,
the SEC promulgated the rule in 1942 to catalyze what many hoped would be a
functional ‘corporate democracy.’”).
23. Id.
24. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Breaking the Corporate Governance Logjam in Washington:
Some Constructive Thoughts on a Responsible Path Forward, 63 BUS. LAW. 1079,
1095-96 (2008) (“A host of precatory proposals on issues like classified boards, poison
pills, executive compensation, and even the voting system have had a powerful
admonitory effect on corporate boards, with corporate boards often voluntarily
assenting to non-binding proposals rather than risking wrath at the next director
election.”).
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The initial problem with precatory proposals was that they were
just too easy to make. 25 Shareholders who had tiny stakes in huge
companies could badger management with unrelated requests and pet
projects. Over the course of the next fifty years, shareholders’ rights to
make proposals and communicate with each other about voting for
proposals and directors was limited by a succession of amendments to
Rule 14a.26 In fact, Rule 14a is one of the most heavily amended rules in
all of securities law. 27 The result of fifty years of pro-management
amendments to Rule 14a was a shareholder voting system so convoluted
and challenging that shareholder democracy virtually disappeared.28
B. THE 1992 AMENDMENTS
In 1992, the SEC finally reversed its course of the previous fifty
years and allowed shareholders to communicate with each other about
shareholder voting.29 SEC Chairman Richard C. Breeden gave a speech
on October 15, 1992, announcing a total overhaul of Rule 14a. His goal
25. See Susan W. Liebeler, A Proposal to Rescind the Shareholder Proposal Rule,
18 GA. L. REV. 425, 428 (1984) (“Following the rule’s adoption in 1942, the SEC
continually revised the rule in an attempt to curb abuses by proponents and to determine
what constitutes a ‘proper subject’ for proposals under state law.”). In fact, the
president of the New York Stock Exchange wrote an open letter to the SEC on October
16, 1942, opposing the new shareholder precatory proposal rule (which was then known
as Rule X-14A-7), on the grounds that such a rule would be another brick in the wall
between markets and efficiency. “[T]he advantages of a listed market may some day be
outweighed by voluminous regulations[,]” NYSE President Emil Schram argued.
Ironically, through the continued lobbying efforts of the NYSE and corporate groups,
Rule 14a itself became a tangled morass of voluminous regulations. Letter from Emil
Schram, President of NYSE, to Ganson Purcell, Chairman, SEC (Oct. 16, 1942),
available
at
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1940/1942_1010_
SchramPurcell.pdf.
26. Rule 14a was amended with additional substantive and procedural restrictions
in 1948, 1952, 1954, 1960, 1972, 1976, 1983 and 1987.
27. See Palmiter, supra note 22, at 882 (“Since its promulgation five decades ago,
the rule itself has undergone no less than fourteen revisions.”).
28. See id. (“Lately, the agency’s interpretive flip-flops in no-action letters have
become legion. . . . In short, the rule is today in chaos.”).
29. Bernard S. Black, Next Steps in Proxy Reform, 18 J. CORP. L. 1, 2 (1993) (“The
Commission’s express goal was to make it easier for shareholders to communicate with
each other, and the amendments certainly move in that direction. The SEC made
important strides in that direction.”).
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was nothing less than to change the dynamics of corporate governance
in America. 30 Breeden recognized that the SEC had created a system
that:
was supposed to protect shareholders [but] sometimes works to
insulate management in problem cases from accountability to their
shareholders . . . a system in which it takes the permission of the
federal government, teams of lawyers and millions of dollars for
shareholders to discuss the future of the company they own in a
31
newspaper op-ed or on a radio talk show.

Mr. Breeden analogized the proxy system to an undemocratic political
system:
If the current proxy rules for corporate elections applied to our
national political elections, then every time citizens wanted to
discuss their views of President Bush, Bill Clinton or Ross Perot,
they would have to file a description of themselves and their views
with the SEC. Discussing tonight’s debate in the newspaper or on
television would require mailing a proxy statement to every
32
registered voter in the country.

On October 22, 1992, the SEC announced that, “[t]he purposes of
the proxy rules themselves are better served by promoting free
discussion, debate and learning among shareholder and interested
persons, than by putting restraints on that process to ensure management
has the ability to address every point raised in the exchange of views.”33
In accord with this newly espoused democratic shareholder philosophy,
the SEC amended the Rule in many critical ways, including rewriting it
in a user-friendly, question-and-answer format.34
Prior to the 1992 amendments, the SEC generally pre-reviewed all
shareholder communications regarding a shareholder vote.35 Shareholder

30. Richard Breeden, Chairman, SEC, Opening Statement at the Open Meeting of
the Commission: Shareholder Communication and Executive Compensation (Oct. 15,
1992), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1992/101592breeden.pdf.
31. Id. at 2-3.
32. Id. at 3.
33. Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-31326, 57 Fed. Reg. 48276-01 (Oct. 22, 1992).
34. Id.
35. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2011).
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opinions were thereby moderated by SEC review.36 After 1992, the SEC
no longer performed this pre-review function because most shareholder
communications no longer had to be filed.37
After the 1992 amendments (which were not promulgated until
1998), shareholders received many new techniques to communicate,
organize, meet and share information with management without
incurring huge expense or delay. Moreover, without SEC pre-review,
unmoderated shareholder communications were far less polite to
management. Vitriolic shareholder messages heralded in a new era of
aggressive shareholder campaigns against management.
Even though Al Gore invented the Internet in the early 1990s,38 the
SEC did not allow shareholders and companies to post shareholder
voting materials on the Internet until 2007. 39 That year, the SEC

36. See Steven A. Rosenblum, The Shareholder Communications Proxy Rules And
Their Practical Effect On Shareholder Activism And Proxy Contests, in A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO SEC PROXY AND COMPENSATION RULES 10-34 (Amy L. Goodman et al. eds.,
5th ed. 2013), available at http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/
WLRK.22925.13.pdf.
37. See id. (“Prior to the 1992 amendments, the SEC generally performed a
moderating function in proxy contests, tempering the more aggressive materials and
forcing the contestants to provide factual support for their arguments and assertions.
Now, the SEC no longer performs this function for most of the materials used in the
contest.”); see also An Overview of the Proxy Solicitation Rules, in A PRACTICAL GUIDE
TO SEC PROXY AND COMPENSATION RULES 9-13 (Amy L. Goodman et al. eds., 5th ed.
2013),
available
at
http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/
WLRK.22925.13.pdf (“A benefit of circulating initial soliciting materials is that they
are not subject to pre-review by the SEC staff. These materials are filed in definitive
form with the SEC on the date they are first used, and can therefore be disseminated
quickly and cost effectively to shareholders.”).
38. Al Gore did not actually invent the Internet. This is a reference to a political
gaffe by the former Vice President during his interview with Wolf Blitzer of CNN on
March 8, 1999. See Glenn Kessler, A Cautionary Tale for Politicians: Al Gore and the
‘Invention’
of
the
Internet,
WASH.
POST
(Nov.
4,
2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/wp/2013/11/04/a-cautionary-talefor-politicians-al-gore-and-the-invention-of-the-internet/. The purpose of this reference
is to highlight that even senior government officials recognized the importance of the
Internet for commerce at least as early as the 1990s.
39. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–16 (2010).
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amended Rule 14a to allow companies to do so (rather than require
companies to physically mail all that paper to shareholders).40
Making shareholder communications cheaper was clearly a primary
purpose of the SEC in enacting this amendment.41 The SEC concluded
that “[t]he amendments put into place processes that will provide
shareholders with notice of, and access to, proxy materials while taking
advantage of technological developments and the growth of the Internet
and electronic communications.” 42 It further stated that “[t]he
amendments also might reduce the costs of engaging in proxy contests
for soliciting persons other than the issuer.”43
The next advance in shareholder communication was to allow it in
real-time through “the use of electronic shareholder forums.” 44 The
problem is, no one really knew what an electronic shareholder forum

40. Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, SEC Release Nos. 34-55146; IC27671; File No. S7-10-05 (Jan. 29, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
final/2007/34-55146.pdf.
41. Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, SEC Release Nos. 34-55146; IC27671; File No. S7-10-05 (Jan. 22, 2007). The SEC underwent a cost-benefit analysis
and determined that “[t]he costs of solicitations ultimately are borne by shareholders.”
Id. at 1. The SEC identified the benefits of the 2007 amendment: (1) more rapid
dissemination of proxy information to shareholders and (2) reduced printing and
mailing costs for issuers and other soliciting persons. Id. at 60. During the prior (2006)
proxy season, Automated Data Processing, Inc.—the corporation which handles the
vast majority of proxy mailings—mailed 85.3 million proxy items to beneficial owners
at an aggregate cost of $962.4 million in printing and mailing costs. Id. at 61. While the
2007 amendments may save the majority of the almost $1 billion annually spent on
paper proxy mailings, the amendment also brought three notable costs: (1) the cost of
preparing and sending a final paper notice to shareholders explaining that future notices
would be on the Internet, (2) the cost of processing shareholders’ requests for paper
copies, which are to be available on demand and (3) the cost to shareholders of printing
paper copies at home. Id. at 65. The highest estimate suggested the rule may potentially
cost up to $100 million in website publishing, administration and home printing costs,
although most of those costs can be avoided if shareholders simply view the proxy
materials electronically instead of printing them. In addition to finding that the 2007
amendments would net nearly $900 million in annual savings, the SEC also found the
amendments would improve the efficiency of the proxy voting process. Id. at 69.
42. Id. at 1.
43. Id.
44. Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Proxy Rule Amendments Encouraging
Electronic Shareholder Forums (Nov. 28, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2007/2007-247.htm/.
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was. Was it a chat room? A social media web site? An open source
blog?
C. SHAREHOLDER SOCIAL MEDIA
Facebook apparently is not an “electronic shareholder forum.”
Social media first got CEOs into trouble on July 3, 2012, when Netflix
CEO Reed Hastings posted to his personal Facebook page, “Netflix
monthly viewing exceeded 1 billion hours for the first time ever in
June.” 45 Netflix stock price increased 10% that day, and the SEC
investigated whether Hastings’ post violated Regulation Fair
Disclosure.46
Regulation Fair Disclosure, or Reg FD, requires public companies
to disclose material information to all shareholders at the same time.47
Reg FD is a relatively new rule promulgated in August 2000. At that
time, only reporters and large investors were invited to the quarterly
analyst conference calls, where results of the past quarter were first
disclosed. Small investors who traded over the Internet wanted equal
access. Reg FD granted them equal access to material non-public
information.
Eventually the SEC found that Reed Hastings’ Facebook post did
not violate Reg FD.48 But that particular determination did not settle the
SEC’s general position on the issue because the SEC expressly stated
that the Hastings decision had no precedential value, although the report
did set out core principles. Accordingly, to avoid liability, companies
and management now tend to file a Form FD and 8-K for every
potentially material tweet, blog post or other social media missive.49

45. Reed Hastings, FACEBOOK.COM (July 3, 2012, 10:57 AM EST),
https://www.facebook.com/reed1960/posts/10150955446914584. The Hastings post
was followed by a 10% increase in Netflix stock price.
46. Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934: Netflix, Inc., and Reed Hastings, Exchange Act Release No. 69279 (Apr.
2, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-69279.pdf.
47. 17 C.F.R § 243 (2011).
48. See supra note 46.
49. See Holly J. Gregory, Social Media and Regulation FD, WEIL GOTSHAL &
MANAGES LLP (May 2013), http://www.weil.com/~/media/files/pdfs/May2013_
Opinion.pdf.
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But activist shareholders don’t have to make these filings. 50 In
contrast to Hastings’ post, the SEC did nothing when Carl Icahn
tweeted, “We currently have a large position in APPLE. We believe the
company to be extremely undervalued.”51 Apple’s stock price increased
by nearly 5% on the day of Icahn’s tweet, adding over $17 billion to its
market capitalization at its intraday high.52 Icahn has since become a
poster child for Twitter activism, employing Tweets to announce new
activist efforts to the market, with great effect. Icahn’s brief dispatches
of less than 140 characters have moved markets, including announcing a
6% stake in Canadian oil and gas explorer Talisman Energy, resulting in
a 6.4% stock price increase in after-hours trading,53 and announcing a
9.4% stake in Family Dollar Stores, resulting in a 9.7% stock price
increase in after-hours trading.54 Forbes described Icahn’s use of Twitter
to publicize an investment in Gannett as “typical Icahn fashion.” Shares
in the media company rose 5% in after-hours trading following Icahn’s
announcement.55

50. Shareholders have some additional disclosure responsibilities after they
become “material” filers pursuant to Regulation 13(d) or 13(g). Obtaining more than
5% of the outstanding stock or purchasing stock with the intent to solicit a tender offer
can trigger material filer status. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d–1 (2011).
51. Carl Icahn, TWITTER (Aug. 13, 2013, 11:21 AM EST), https://twitter.com/
carl_c_icahn/status/367350206993399808.
52. Steven Russolillo, The iCahn Effect: Apple’s Market Cap Jumps by $17 Billion
After Tweets, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 13, 2013). Commentators attribute a $12.5 billion
increase in Apple’s market cap in just one hundred minutes to the Ichan tweet. See, e.g.,
Julianne Pepitone, Carl Icahn Takes ‘Large’ Apple Stake, CNN MONEY (Aug. 13,
2013), available at http://money.cnn.com/2013/08/13/technology/mobile/carl-icahnapple/.
53. Agustino Fontevecchia, Tweeting Carl Icahn: Billionaire Unveils 6% Stake in
Talisman Energy, FORBES (Oct. 7, 2013, 5:45 PM EST), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
afontevecchia/2013/10/07/tweeting-carl-icahn-billioniare-investor-unveils-6-stake-intalisman-energy/.
54. William Alden, Carl Icahn Discloses Stake in Family Dollar, DEALBOOK—N
.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/06/06/icahn-disclosesstake-in-family-dollar/?_r=0.
55. Samantha Sharf, Carl Icahn Reveals Gannett Stake, Breakup Support, FORBES
(Aug. 14, 2014, 6:28 PM EST), http://www.forbes.com/sites/samanthasharf/2014/
08/14/carl-icahn-reveals-gannett-stake-breakup-support/.
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II. TILTING THE PLAYING FIELD AGAINST MANAGEMENT
Shareholders can use social media in ways management cannot.
Reg FD applies to Reed Hastings, CEO of Netflix, but not Carl Icahn,
stockholder of Apple. Activists can now access virtually all shareholders
and influence public opinion through social networks, relatively
unencumbered by reporting requirements under SEC rules. But
management cannot simply tweet back to the critiques of activists.
Despite the fact that Hastings was found not to have violated Reg FD
with his Facebook post, it is not clear that management can simply
respond to activist banter without risking a disclosure violation.
Management has to fight proxy battles in the social network arena with
one hand tied behind its keyboard while activists use the full power of
social media to their advantage.
Management does have one advantage: the power of the purse.
Management can pay for its own re-election campaign with corporate
money. In such a “proxy contest,” management might spend up to
$22,000,000 of corporate money to stay in power, 56 which is lawful
under Delaware law.57 However, board access to the corporate coffers to
fund reelection campaigns—an antidemocratic feature of corporate
law—might become less significant as shareholder engagement gets
56. The estimated cost of the management of CSX Corporation to battle 3G Capital
Partners in the proxy contest announced on October 16, 2007 was $22 million. The
dissident—who won—spent approximately $9 million to obtain board representation of
this $18.6 billion company. SHARKREPELLANT.NET (last visited Sept. 21, 2014) (on file
with author).
57. See Daniel M. Friedman, Expenses of Corporate Proxy Contests, 51 COLUM. L.
REV. 951, 952 (1951) (“The right of the management to assess the corporate treasury
for certain expenses incurred in the solicitation of proxies is well settled. The only
requirement laid down by the courts is that the issue presented to the stockholders must
involve a ‘question of corporate policy,’ as distinguished from a ‘mere matter of
personnel.’ Once this test is met, the management may properly expend corporate funds
to present its side of the controversy to the stockholders and solicit their continued
support.”); see also Hand v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 54 F. Supp. 649 (D. Del.
1944) (“[W]here stockholders are called on to decide controversies over substantial
questions of policy as distinguished from inconsequential matters and personnel of
management, directors may make such expenditures from corporate funds as are
reasonably necessary to inform stockholders of considerations in support of the policy
advocated by directors under attack, and in such communications directors may solicit
proxies in their favor.” (citing Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Picture Screen Corp., 171 A.
226 (Del. Ch. 1934))).
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cheaper and more democratized. 58 Modern low-cost yet effective
shareholder campaigns abound. For example, for four consecutive years
shareholders have organized to press ExxonMobil and other oil and gas
companies to disclose the dangers of hydraulic fracking.59 Management
vehemently opposed this corporate social responsibility initiative. But
when the ExxonMobil shareholders got enough votes to pass a precatory
proposal for fracking risk disclosure, management capitulated.60
Other shareholder campaigns are less successful in moving
management to change its policies, but they may yet be effective in
accomplishing goals of awareness and corporate social responsibility.
For example, Grassroots activist shareholders—who originally
organized on the Internet—descended on Safeway’s annual shareholder
meeting to protest genetically modified (“GMO”) foods. Inside the
meeting, shareholders voted on a proposal to remove GMO foods from
Safeway shelves that was proposed by the Sisters of Notre Dame de
Namur, a Roman Catholic order, who owned 8,800 shares of Safeway
stock,61 representing only about 0.00173% of the outstanding shares at
that time.62
Only 2% of shareholders supported the proposal to remove GMO
ingredients from its products,63 and the proposal did not pass, but the
demonstrations—which consisted of shareholders in biohazard suits

58. Tina Casey, Shareholders Press for More Disclosure from Fracking
Companies, TRIPLEPUNDIT (May 23, 2013), http://www.triplepundit.com/2013/05/
shareholders-press-companies-to-disclose-fracking-risk/.
59. Id.
60. Ernest Scheyder, ExxonMobil Agrees to Share More Data on Fracking Risks,
REUTERS, Apr. 3, 2014, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/03/usexxonmobil-fracking-data-idUSBREA3227020140403.
61. Dale Kasler, Biotech Foods Get Safeway Yes Vote—Shareholders Soundly
Reject Ban Proposal, Sacramento Bee, May 10, 2000, at G1.
62. See Safeway Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Sept. 11, 1999) available at
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/86144/000095014999001830/000095014999-001830.txt (“As of October 21, 1999, there were issued and outstanding 508.8
million shares of the registrant’s common stock.”).
63. Sandra Gonzales, Ban on Genetically Engineered Foods Sacked by Safeway
Shareholders Defeat Activists’ Bid, San Jose Mercury News, May 10, 2000, at C1.
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dumping Safeway produce in garbage bins in front of the hotel where
the annual meeting was held—attracted significant media attention.64
Another grassroots movement, 99% Power, an offshoot from the
Occupy Wall Street movement,65 organized protests at the shareholder
meetings of major banks during their annual meetings in Spring 2012.66
At least 500 protesters gathered at the Wells Fargo annual shareholders
meeting, of which about two dozen were arrested for chaining
themselves together to block entry to the meeting at the bank’s
headquarters and for entering the meeting and interrupting CEO John
Stumpf during his presentation.67 The protest, which included signs that
read “Hells Fargo” and hand-outs of dollars bills with an image of a
stagecoach (Wells Fargo’s corporate logo) pulled by human beings with
the caption “Debt Slavery,” became so active that some shareholders
were not allowed to enter the meeting.68 One such shareholder even used
64. See Julie Light, Seeds of Resistance: Grassroots Activism vs. Biotech
Agriculture,
CORPWATCH
(May
25,
2000),
http://www.corpwatch.org/
article.php?id=572; Kasler, supra note 61.
65. See Jason Cherkis, Ninety-Nine Percept Power: Activists Ready to Crash Wells
Fargo, General Electric Shareholder Meetings, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 23, 2012, 4:09
PM EST), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/23/ninety-nine-percent-power_n_
1446605.html (last updated Apr. 23, 2012, 5:00 PM EST).
66. The protests are well documented in mainstream media, but curiously they are
only attributed to “the 99%” by activist media. See, e.g., Maria Poblet, 99% Power
Movement Kicks Off with Massive Actions at Wells Fargo Shareholder Meeting,
ALTERNET (Apr. 22, 2012) (“This year, there’s a nationally coordinated effort of the
99% to fight back…We’re starting off with Wells Fargo.”), available at
http://www.alternet.org/story/155097/99_power_movement_kicks_off_with_massive_a
ctions_at_wells_fargo_shareholder_meeting; Tcnk, 99% Power—Wells Fargo
Shareholders Meeting Disrupted, IN YOUR FACE RADIO (Apr. 26, 2012), available at
http://inyourfaceradio.net/99-power-wells-fargo-shareholders-meeting-disrupted-miccheck/; 99% Power Week of Action: Confront the Corporate 1% April 22-28,
ACTIONWEB (“Tuesday’s action was the first in a series of nation-wide protests set to
taking on America’s largest corporations over the next two months, organized by a
national coalition of progressive organizations called 99% Power.”), available at
https://actionnetwork.org/campaigns/99-power-week-of-action-confronting-thecorporate-1-including-walmart-bank-of-america-wellsfargo-and-sallie-april-22-28
(official website of the 99% Power movement) (last visited Jan. 16, 2015).
67. Dakin Campbell & Mark Chediak, Wells Fargo Protestors Disrupt Stump
Speech at Meeting, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 25, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2012-04-24/wells-fargo-protesters-impede-shareholders-at-annual-meeting.
68. Josh Harkinson, Wells Fargo Turns Away Its Own Shareholders from Its
Shareholder Meeting, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 24, 2012, 5:28 PM EST),
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the protest’s Twitter hashtag to voice her frustration that the protest
prevented her from voting her shares.69
Just like the physical protests in the Arab Spring that were
organized through social media platforms, grassroots shareholder
activism can be organized and empowered by Twitter and Facebook. In
fact, the Wells Fargo protest was planned, organized and broadcast live
using social media. The web site “Stop Wells Fargo” was established to
focus attention on and raise support for “major disruptions” at the Wells
Fargo shareholder meeting. 70 Visitors to that website were invited to
“Follow the action on Twitter with #wf24 #wfshareholders
#notfeelingwells71 and on Facebook.72
Such happenings suggest that shareholder activism may face some
of the same challenges as political activism and potentially look less like
Bulldog Investors73 and more like Occupy Wall Street.74 Brayden King75
http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2012/04/wells-fargo-turns-away-its-ownshareholders-annual-meeting.
69. Wanda, TWITTER (Apr. 24, 2012, 7:17 PM EST), https://twitter.com/
itsWanda/status/194973491412480000 (“Protesters air grievances at WellsFargo mtg
… #wf24 #wfshareholders #OSF #OWS Too bad I couldn’t get in to vote my
shares[.]”); Wanda, TWITTER (Apr. 24, 2012, 6:21 PM EST), https://twitter.com/
itsWanda/status/194959323749822464 (“I was disappointed I didn’t get in to vote my
shares at #WF24. &was lectured by a few brave human blockaders for trying to go in.
#suitbloc[.]”).
70. Press Release, Stop Wells Fargo, Major Disruptions Planned At Wells Fargo
Shareholder Meeting As “The 99% Take Over” (Apr. 24, 2012),
http://www.stopwellsfargo.com/en/press (“On Tuesday, April 24, thousands of people
will confront Wells Fargo executives at the financial institution’s annual shareholder
meeting, risking arrest in by attempting to shut down the meeting and disrupt the
proceedings in order to demand Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf and other executives
address the concerns of the 99%.”).
71. Id. (“Follow the action on Twitter with #wf24 #wfshareholders
#notfeelingwells [and] On Facebook at: http://www.facebook.com/events/
203308649774621/.”).
72. Id.; see also The 99% Take Over #wf24, FACEBOOK (last visited Mar. 5, 2015),
https://www.facebook.com/events/203308649774621/ (Facebook page used to inform
participants about Stop Wells Fargo protests).
73. Bulldog Investors is run by activist investor Phillip Goldstein, who is notable
for his consistent value-oriented investment strategy. Goldstein identifies companies
that appear to be undervalued because of mismanagement and seeks to replace
management.
74. Occupy Wall Street was a grassroots protest movement characterized by
concerns with global and social inequality but lacking central leadership or a clear
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has noted that activism through social media is inherently different from
“classic” activism. It is not, “we are going to tout the party line, we are
going to say what the NGOs are telling us to say.” Instead, King notes
that it is, “we are going to personalize it. And this can catch activists by
surprise. They may have gotten the ball rolling, but what actually occurs
falls out of the control of any hierarchical entity.”76 The most poignant
distinction is that grassroots shareholder activism can quickly become
unpredictable.
Grassroots shareholder activism is not necessarily directed at
unlocking shareholder value. There have been numerous studies on
whether shareholders’ ability to control or at least reign in corporate
activity increases share prices.77 This inquiry is particularly pertinent to
the shareholder social media activism. Many grassroots shareholder
campaigns are sponsored by shareholders with minimal holdings. The
old name for these pesky shareholders was “corporate gadflies.”78 Some
gadflies are peskier than others: two-thirds of all proposals submitted to
Fortune 150 companies between January 1, 2008 and August 1, 2011 by
individual investors came from Evelyn Davis and members of the
Steiner, Chevedden, and Rossi families.79
Non-profits have formed solely to purchase minimal amounts of
securities and leverage Rule 14a to make precatory proposals to major
message. In fact, Adbusters lampooned the movement in a poster for it that read, “What
is our one demand? #occupywallstreet September 17th. Bring Tent.” See Michael Bierut,
The Poster that Launched a Movement (Or Not), The Design Observer Group (April 30,
2012), http://designobserver.com/feature/the-poster-that-launched-a-movement-or-not/
32588/.
75. Northwestern University Kellogg School of Management, Associate Professor
of Management and Organizations, http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/
directory/king_brayden.aspx.
76. Jessica Love, Corporate Activism Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, KELLOGG
INSIGHT (Mar. 3, 2014), available at http://insight.kellogg.northwestern.edu/article/
corporate_activism_yesterday_today_and_tomorrow (Interview with Brayden King &
Klaus Weber).
77. See, e.g., Activists Beat S&P 500 in 48 Percent Gain for Shareholders,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 31, 2014), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/infographics/
2014-03-31/activists-beat-s-p-500-in-48-percent-gain-for-shareholders.html.
78. The gadfly is a tiny fly that annoys horses. The name also refers to a person
who upsets the status quo.
79. James R. Copland, A Report on Corporate Governance and Shareholder
Activism, PROXY MONITOR (Sept. 2011), http://www.proxymonitor.org/Reports/
Proxy_Monitor_2011.pdf.
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corporations. As You Sow, a non-profit founded in 1992 to increase
corporate accountability, launched its shareholder activism program in
1997,80 whereby As You Sow would purchase $2,000 in securities, hold
them for one year, then make precatory proposals related to various
social issues.81 Corporate social responsibility activist As You Sow is a
perfect example of how a shareholder may purchase securities for
purposes other than value creation.
Whether shareholder democracy is good or bad is an immensely
personal and political question. Corporate law has not—and may
never—settle on whether corporations must maximize shareholder
wealth or prioritize corporate social responsibility. It is clear, however,
that social media, in an age of already increasing shareholder democracy
and activism, is a powerful new tool for proponents of corporate social
responsibility.
III. TECHNOLOGY AND DEMOCRATIC SHAREHOLDER REFORMS
A public corporation is similar to a republic in that both
employ representative democracy. Shareholders delegate broad
decision-making powers to a board of directors, just as voting citizens
delegate lawmaking powers to legislators. A direct democracy,82 on the
other hand, allows citizens to directly partake in voting on policy

80. This program was formerly described on the website of As You Sow under a
section titled “Our Methods,” but that non-profit has since removed any explanation of
its methods from its web site. Instead, their tactic is now described in a blurb titled
“Power of the Proxy” on their web site. Our Work, AS YOU SOW,
http://www.asyousow.org/our-work/.
81. See id. As You Sow has proposed shareholder votes on topics including: no
smoking in movies (not only in the theatre but also on the screen), keeping
nanomaterials and genetic modifications out of food, reducing consumer packaging,
eliminating child labor from cotton fields in Uzbekistan and mineral mines in the
Congo and reducing executive compensation.
82. Examples of political direct democracies include the ancient Greek city-state of
Athens and the modern Swiss Cantons of Glarus and Appenzell Innerrhoden.
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decisions by referendum. 83 The framers of the American constitution
disfavored direct democracy,84 as does corporate law.
Historic transformations in the way we communicate could make
corporate direct democracy, in which shareholder voters play an integral
role in a broad scope of corporate decision-making, possible and even
practical. With just a few SEC-sponsored tweaks to the federal securities
law and some modifications to key state statutes like the Delaware
General Corporations Law, American public companies could be run as
direct democracies. Innovations like webcasting, Twitter and Internet
Protocol Security make it feasible for shareholders to gain immediate
access to extensive managerial and operational information and vote in
real-time on a wide array of corporate matters.
In light of the social-media organized mass movements like the
Arab Spring and Occupy Wall Street—and being mindful of corporate
social responsibility organizations like As You Sow—would
shareholder direct democracy be a glorious conclusion to the capitalist
era, or would it be a crippling impediment to efficient economic
functioning? Some may have a bias toward one approach or the other.
But a middle road to this modern circumstance is to let the market
determine which corporate political structure is best.
The SEC does not have to mandate corporate direct democracy. But
the SEC could allow it. Individual public corporations would then have
the option to allow shareholder direct democracy or retain the traditional
framework of delegation to and representation by a board of directors.
Empirical studies are conflicted on whether shareholder primacy is
efficient, and whether markets value it. 85 A 2003 study found that
83. Some American states allow citizen-sponsored direct initiatives to amend the
state constitution, including: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon and South Dakota.
84. Alexander Hamilton stated “that a pure democracy, if it were practicable,
would be the most perfect government. Experience has proved, that no position in
politics is more false than this. The ancient democracies, in which the people
themselves deliberated, never possessed one feature of good government. Their very
character was tyranny; their figure deformity. When they assembled, the field of debate
presented an ungovernable mob, not only incapable of deliberation, but prepared for
every enormity.” Alexander Hamilton, Speech on the Compromises of the Constitution,
Poughkeepsie, New York (June 20, 1788) in THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 22
(Federal Edition, vol. 2, Henry Cabot Lodge ed., G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1904), available
at http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/1379.
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stronger shareholder rights correlated with higher firm value, higher
profits, higher sales growth, lower capital expenditures and fewer
corporate acquisitions. 86 But in 2013, Lynn Stout argued that more
recent studies conclusively show that shareholder primacy does not
maximize shareholder value (measured by share price).87
Maximizing shareholder value, however, is only one goal of
corporate activity. Corporate social responsibility is, increasingly,
another. Corporate direct democracy should not be prohibited as a
possible corporate form even if it does not maximize shareholder value
in every instance or even in the majority of cases.
Certain businesses may benefit from direct shareholder democracy
while others may be harmed by it. Highly secretive firms like Apple, for
instance, may find their bottom line is hit hard when decisions are made
by the masses. Organic food retailers like Whole Foods, however, may
find shareholder direct democracy gives them legitimacy in a
marketplace where shoppers choose the most transparent and
community oriented company.
In point of fact, many corporations today voluntarily expend
money, make disclosures, and commit to social-benefit promises to
become certified as benefit corporations, or B-corporations. 88 A Bcorporation is a type of for-profit entity that has some non-profit
characteristics (but not its tax-exempt treatment). The shareholders of a
B-corporation agree (at least theoretically) to evaluate the company
based on its societal or environmental impact, and not solely on its
profits.
The corporate landscape is changing. Corporations have a broader
range of purposes than they did even a few short years ago. The world is
85. See., e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of
Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 642 (2006).
86. Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity
Prices, 118 Quarterly J. Econ. 107, 107 (2003).
87. Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth, CORNELL LAW FACULTY
PUBLICATIONS, http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/771/.
88. Today, there are at least twelve third-party companies that provide standards
and evaluations to register as a “B-corporation.” “B-corporation” is not a legal status.
The designation is more like a USDA Organic certification. Most B-corporations are,
from a legal perspective, Delaware corporations that do not make the “S” election.
However, B-corporations in certain states may not have to conform with shareholder
wealth maximization modes of existence, such as those articulated by the seminal case,
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
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changing, too. Technology is allowing people to connect and coordinate
across virtually any distance, regardless of social or political barriers.
Corporate America is not immune to these changes. New forms of
corporations are emerging, as are new forms of corporate governance,
and new goals of investors. In light of these changes, the SEC has the
opportunity to unlock shareholder governance, allowing states to create
new kinds of corporations. Justice Brandeis famously stated that, “It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.” 89 Shareholder direct democracy is a prime example of just
such an economic experiment. Continuing the trend of shareholder
empowerment exemplified by states like North Dakota,90 a courageous
state might take on Delaware’s hegemony over incorporation by
offering shareholders an unprecedented level of influence and
involvement in the companies they own.
One way to unlock new shareholder governance regimes is simply
to allow Internet voting. The shareholder annual meeting is an
anachronism. It imposes great expenses on shareholders, effectively
excluding many would-be participants. The direct beneficiaries of the
current system are the institutional investors. Small shareholders who
cannot afford to attend the meeting are excluded from the process, or at
the very least left with limited access to information and diminished
interaction with board members and management, just as small
shareholders who were not invited to attend the quarterly analyst calls
were excluded from timely receiving material non-public information.
Corporations will either modify their bylaws to allow virtual
shareholder meetings and Internet voting, or they will preserve the status
quo. By opening up a new avenue for shareholder engagement, the SEC
will create an opportunity for the market to decide what mixture of
shareholder corporate control it values most—even if that control is
democratized.

89.
90.

New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
See Larry Ribstein, The North Dakota Experiment, THE HARVARD LAW
SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (Apr. 23,
2007), available at http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2007/04/23/
the-north-dakota-experiment/.

716

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XX

CONCLUSION
The shareholder revolution will not be televised. It will be
simulcast, tweeted, liked, shared and +1’d. Human communication is
changing due to technologic advancement, and inter-shareholder
communication is changing along with it. SEC rules about how
shareholders may communicate with each other and management
currently restrain the potentially disruptive force of innovative
communication, but changes to a few simple rules could open up a
world of new possibilities for shareholder activism. If the last twentyfive years of shareholder regulation tend to predict its future, the trend
of SEC liberalization of shareholder communication will likely
continue. Shareholder democracy, long considered a myth, may soon
become a reality. The question remains, how much democracy do we
really want?

